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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
On January 7, 2007, Mallory Martinez fka Larson ("Ms. Martinez") was on
duty with the Idaho Army National Guard when she was involved in an automobile
accident with William Teurlings ("plaintiff'). (R, Vol. 1, p. 167,

~~5-7;

p. 170; p. 173,

~~

5-7). On January 6, 2009, plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging one state law claim of
negligence against Ms. Martinez. (R, pp. 7-9). Plaintiff's Complaint did not contain any
federal claims. See id.
B. Course of Proceedings
Because National Guard members are exempt from liability for state law
claims arising out of their activities when they are in training or acting under duty, Ms.
Martinez filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking the Court to dismiss plaintiff's
Complaint. (R, pp.157-177). On July 13,2012, the District Court granted Ms. Martinez'
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R, pp. 326-338). Final Judgment dismissing plaintiffs
Complaint against Ms. Martinez was entered on July 19,2012. (R, p. 340).
On July 27, 2012, plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion
to Alter or Amend the Judgment. (R, pp. 342-343, 353-354). On October 4, 2012, the
District Court denied plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment. (R, pp. 379-384).
Notice of Appeal. (R, pp. 385-389).
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On November 15, 2012, plaintiff filed his

c.

Facts
Ms. Martinez is a member of the Idaho Army National Guard, 145 th HHC

Support Battalion, headquartered in Lewiston, Idaho. She has been a member of the
National Guard for over nine (9) years and has currently achieved the rank of E-5 Sergeant. (R, p. 374). As a member of the National Guard, unless she has been called to
active duty, Ms. Martinez is required to attend monthly instruction drills. Attendance at
the drills is mandated by federal law. (R, p. 167,
seq.).

~4;

p. 173,

~3;

and 32 U.S.C. § 502 et.

January 7, 2007, was the final day of one of the 145 th 's regularly scheduled

instruction drills in Lewiston, Idaho and Ms. Martinez was in attendance. (R, p. 167, ~ 4).
On January 7, 2007, Ms. Martinez' chain of command consisted of her Section Sergeant
Tony Rice, First Sergeant Frost and Captain James Deverteuil. (R, p. 173, ~4).
Each guardsman is on duty from 12:00 a.m. the first date of training until
11 :59 p.m. the final day of training. (R, p. 167,

~

5). In January of 2007, Ms. Martinez

was on duty with the National Guard from 12:00 a.m. on January 6,2007 until 11 :59 p.m.
on January 7, 2007. See id. In January of 2007, Ms. Martinez lived in Boise, Idaho.
Another guardsman, who was also a member of the 145 th , lived in the Boise as well. Ms.
Martinez was instructed by her superior officer SSG Rice to provide transportation for
her fellow guardsman to and from the drill in Lewiston that was completed on January 7,
2007. (R, p. 167,

~

6; p. 173,

~

5) At the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was

complying with that Order. (R, p. 173, ~~ 5-6).
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After the accident, Ms. Martinez reported it to SSG Rice and a Line of Duty
Investigation was completed by the Army National Guard. Ms. Martinez participated in
the investigation and the determination was made that she was on duty at the time of the
accident. (R, pp. 167-168,

~

7; pp. 170-171; p. 173,

~

7, pp. 176-177). As a result, her

medical bills were paid by the Army National Guard. (See id.; see also R, p. 174, ~ 8).
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Whether the District Court properly determined, as a matter of law, that Ms.

Martinez was acting pursuant to duty with the Idaho National Guard, in
accordance with I.C. §6-904(4), at the time of the accident that is the subject of
plaintiffs Complaint.
2. Whether the District Court properly determined that Ms. Martinez was acting
within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident that is
the subject of plaintiff s Complaint.
3. Whether the District Court properly determined that, in the alternative, if the
"coming and going rule" applies to this case, the "special errand exception"
applies to establish that Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of
her employment.
4. Whether the District Court properly denied plaintiffs Motion to Strike.
5. Whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
6. Whether Ms. Martinez is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
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IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review.
In an appeal from an Order of Summary Judgment, this Court's standard of
review is de novo, applying the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on a
Motion for Summary Judgment. See Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125
Idaho 270,272,869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). In addition, when an appeal is from a grant
of summary judgment that implicates statutory interpretation, "the interpretation of a
statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." Grazer v. Jones,
294 P.3d 184, 190 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
LR.C.P.56(c).
"The nonmoving party must submit more than just conc1usory assertions
that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. ... A mere scintilla of
evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. .. " Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,
897, 155 P.3d 695,698 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
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B. The District Court Properly Determined that Ms. Martinez was Acting
Pursuant to Duty With the Idaho National Guard, in Accordance With I.C.
§6-904(4), at the Time of the Accident.
Idaho Code § 6-904 states:
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within
the course and scope of their employment and without malice
or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ...
4. Arises out of the activities of the Idaho national guard
when engaged in training or duty under sections 316, 502,
503, 504, 505 or 709, title 32, United States Code.

Id. (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 6-904 was last amended in 1988. See id.
32 U.S.C.A § 502 states in pertinent part that:
(a) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be,
each company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the
National Guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned,
shall:
(1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor
target practice, at least 48 times each year; and
(2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers,
outdoor target practice, or other exercises, at least 15
days each year.
There are no Idaho cases interpreting Idaho Code § 6-904(4) in its present
form. In Baca et. al. v. State of Idaho, The Idaho Army Reserve National Guard et. al.,
119 Idaho 782, 810 P.2d 720 (1990), the Court analyzed the previous version of Idaho
Code § 6-904(4), codified in 1987 and designated as Idaho Code § 6-904(5). The Court
stated:
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In 1987, Senate Bill 1161, which became Chapter 361,
amended Section 6-904(5) of the Tort Claims Act, the same
subsection amended in 1974 to eliminate the Guard's
immunity when acting under a call of the Governor. SB 1161
closed a loophole in Section 6-904(5) by ensuring that the
State of Idaho would not be liable for actions of the Guard
in instances where the federal government had assumed
full responsibility.
Id. at 793, 810 P.2d at 731 (emphasis added).

In Baca, two Idaho Army National Guard members were driving fire
fighters back to camp when they were involved in an automotive accident most likely
caused by fatigue. Id. at 784, 810 P.2d at 722. The court found the exemption in Idaho
Code § 6-904(4) did not apply because the Guard members were not engaged in training
or duty pursuant to any of the federal regulations identified in Idaho Code § 6-904(4) but
rather had been called to action by the Governor of the State of Idaho who declared a
state of emergency because of the Anderson creek fire. See id. at 793-794, 810 P .2d at
731-732. Under those circumstances, the state of Idaho is responsible for the actions of
the Guard members acting within the course and scope of their duty under state authority.
Seeid.

On January 7, 2007, when the accident in this case occurred, Ms. Martinez
was a member of the Idaho National Guard, on duty pursuant to 32 U.S.C.A. §502 and
complying with a direct order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman
to Boise, Idaho. (R, pp. 167-168,

~

7; pp. 170-171, 173-174, 176-177). Ms. Martinez's

superior officer, SSG Tony Rice, explained in his affidavit that National Guard members

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

-10-

are on duty until 11 :59 p.m. on the last day of the mandatory drill. (R, p. 167, ~ 5). This
accident occurred at 12:43 p.m. (R, p. 170).
Ms. Martinez was being paid by the National Guard when this accident
occurred. (R, p. 167,

~

5; p. 253). In addition, at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez

was carrying out a specific order from her superior officer to transport a fellow
guardsman to Boise. (R, p. 167, ~ 6; p. 173,

~

6). The exemption under Idaho Code § 6-

904(4) is not limited to training activities performed pursuant to 32 U.S.C.A § 502 but
"training or duty."

I.C. § 6-904(4). The fact that Ms. Martinez was acting pursuant to

duty at the time of the accident was confirmed by the investigation completed by the
National Guard Bureau. (R, pp. 170-171, 174, 176-177). Because Ms. Martinez was
injured while on duty, the medical bills she incurred as a result of the accident were paid
by the Army National Guard. See id. If Ms. Martinez had not been acting in accordance
to duty at the time of the accident, her medical bills would not have been paid by the
National Guard.
In addition, at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez and the passenger she
was transporting were in full uniform with their rank and military affiliation clearly
displayed. (R, p. 374). Ms. Martinez rode in the ambulance with plaintiff and he would
have observed her in her military uniform. See id.
Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her employment
with the Idaho National Guard and in accordance with her duty with the National Guard
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on January 7, 2007, when this accident occurred. As stated previously, the rationale
behind Idaho Code § 6-904(4) is to exempt Idaho National Guard members from liability
when they are acting pursuant to duty or participating in trainings and drills mandated by
the federal government because the federal government assumes liability during that time
period. See Baca, 119 Idaho at 793, 810 P.2d at 731.
The appropriate forum for the resolution of claims arising under those
circumstances is federal court with federal claims. The only claim plaintiff alleged in his
Complaint in this matter was a state law claim for negligence for which, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 6-904(4), Ms. Martinez cannot be held liable.

As such, plaintiff's

Complaint against Ms. Martinez was properly dismissed by the District Court.
C. The District Court Properly Determined that Ms. Martinez was Acting
Within the Course and Scope of Her Employment With the Idaho National
Guard at the Time of the Accident.
Because Ms. Martinez was acting in accordance to duty with the Idaho
National Guard at the time of the accident, the next question in the analysis is whether
she was also acting within the course and scope of her employment. See Idaho Code § 6904. In Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 50 P.3d 1004 (2002), the Court held that,
"[a]cts that are within the scope of employment are 'those acts which are so closely
connected with what the servant is supposed to do, and so fairly and reasonably
incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones,
of carrying out the objectives of employment.'" Id. (quoting The Richard J. and Esther E.
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Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184,983 P.2d 834, 838 (1999».

The Court further explained, based on Wooley, " ... that an employee's conduct is within
the scope of employment if 'it is of the kind which he is employed to perform, occurs
substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master. '" Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

"As a general statement of these rules, Idaho courts have stated that the test for whether
an employee was acting within the scope of employment when he committed a tort is the
right to control reserved by the employer over the functions and duties of the agent."
Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 945, 854 P.2d 280,288 (1993)

(internal citations omitted).
The same undisputed facts that establish that Ms. Martinez was acting in
accordance to duty at the time of the accident are the facts that establish that she was
acting within the course and scope of her employment. Ms. Martinez was in uniform and
considered on duty until 11 :59 p.m. that evening. (R, p. 167, ~ 5; p. 374, ~~ 3-4).
Ms. Martinez was being paid by the National Guard when this accident
occurred. (See id; see also R, p. 253). In Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 110 Idaho
871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), the Court stated that compensation of an
employee while they are traveling will justify a finding that the employee is an employee
acting within the course and scope of their employment. See id.
In addition, at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was carrying out a
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specific order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise. (R, p.
167, ~ 6; p. 173, ~ 6). Complying with the instructions of her immediate supervisor shows
that Ms. Martinez was engaged in conduct that was at least in part, for the purpose of
serving the master. See Wooley, 133 Idaho at 184, 983 P.2d at 838. It also establishes
that Ms. Martinez' immediate supervisor had the requisite amount of control necessary
over her functions and duties because he directed her to transport her fellow guardsman
to Boise and she was doing it. See Podolan, 123 Idaho at 945, 854 P.2d at 288.
Plaintiff argues that because the other guardsman assisted in paying the gas
expense incurred while traveling to Boise that it somehow negates the fact that that Ms.
Martinez was complying with her superior officer's instruction. (See Appellant's Brief, p.
17). In Mortimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 840 P.2d 383 (1992), the Court
stated that "[a]n act done partly for personal reasons and partly to serve an employer is
still within the scope of employment." Id. at 845, 840 P.2d at 389 (internal citations
omitted).
While sharing the expense was beneficial to Ms. Martinez, it doesn't
change the fact that she was acting at the direction and control of her superior officer and
acting within the course and scope of her employment with the Idaho National Guard
when the accident occurred on January 7, 2007.
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D. Whether the District Court Properly Determined that, in the Alternative, if
the "Coming and Going Rule" Applies to this Case, the "Special Errand
Exception" Applies to Establish that Ms. Martinez was Acting Within the
Course and Scope of Her Employment.
1. Exceptions to the coming and going rule establish that Ms. Martinez
was acting within the course and scope of her employment.
Plaintiff argues that Ms. Martinez was not acting within the course and
scope of her employment based upon the application of a rule used in workers'
compensation cases which "provides that an employee is ordinarily not in the course of
employment when going to or coming from work." Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 17,921
P.2d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). The rule is commonly referred to as the "coming and
going rule," to which there are numerous exceptions.
One such exception is that of the traveling employee. Pursuant to Andrews
v. Les Boise Masonry, Inc., 127 Idaho 65, 67, 896 P.2d 973, 975 (1995), the Supreme

Court ofIdaho stated the traveling employee doctrine in Idaho is as follows:
When an employee's work requires the employee to travel
away from the employer's place of business or the employee's
normal place of work, the employee will be held to be within
the course and scope of employment continuously during the
trip, except when a distinct departure for personal business
occurs.
Id. (emphasis added). In Ridgeway v. Combined Ins. Cos. ofAm., 98 Idaho 410,565 P.2d

1367 (1977), the Court applied the traveling employee exception to a two week business
trip the employee was required to take and stated that injuries incurred on the trip
including "... 'injuries arising out of the necessity of sleeping in hotels or eating in
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restaurants away from home are usually held compensable.'" Id. at 411-412, 565 P.2d at
1368-69 (internal citations omitted).

It is undisputed that in January of 2007, Ms. Martinez lived and worked in
Boise, Idaho. (R, pp. 246-248, 252). As part of her employment with the Idaho National
Guard, Ms. Martinez was required to drive from Boise, Idaho to Lewiston, Idaho once a
month to attend federally mandated training drills. (R, p. 173). Although the Guard did
not pay for Ms. Martinez's traveling expenses, that factor alone is not dispositive of
whether an employee will be considered a traveling employee. See Andrews, 127 Idaho at
67, 896 P.2d at 975.
The more significant factor is that Ms. Martinez participated in the two day
trainings and was paid by the National Guard for her on-duty time which ended at 11 :59
p.m. on the evening of January 7, 2007. (R, p. 253; p. 167,

~

5). In Barker v. Fischbach

& Moore, Inc., 110 Idaho 871, 872, 719 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1986), the Court held that

compensation of an employee while they are traveling will justify a finding that the
employee is a traveling employee acting within the course and scope of their
employment. See id.

Based on the facts in this case, Ms., Martinez was a traveling

employee to whom the coming and going rule does not apply.
In Finholdt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 (2007), the Court
renewed its approval of a second exception to the coming and going rule for "an
employee who, 'although not at his regular place of employment, even before or after
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customary working hours, is doing, is on his way home from performing, or on the way
from his home to perform, some special service or errand or the discharge of some duty
incidental to the nature of his employment in the interest of, or under direction of his
employer.'" Id. at 898, 155 P.3d at 699 (internal citations omitted).

It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was carrying
out a specific order from her superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise.
(R, p. 167,

~

6; p. 173,

~

6). As the District Court held, Ms. Martinez was acting at the

direction and control of her superior officer and carrying out a special errand / order on
behalf of the National Guard while traveling on January 7, 2007. (See id.; see also R, p.
334-335). Because the special errand exception to the coming and going rule applies to
the facts of this case, at the time of the accident, Ms. Martinez was acting within the
course and scope of her employment with the Idaho National Guard.
A third applicable exception to the coming and going rule in this case is
when the employer agrees, either expressly or impliedly, that the employment
relationship shall continue during the period of coming and going. See Colorado Civil Air
Patrol v. Hagans, 662 P.2d 194 (Colo.

ct. App.,

1983). In Hagans, Thomas Hagans was

a volunteer member of the Colorado Civil Air Patrol ("C.A.P.") who crashed in a plane
during a 75 mile trip from his home while he was on his way to attend a regularly
scheduled C.A.P. training. See id. at 195. The following facts were noted by the court:
On March 11, 1980, Hagans and his brother, who was also a
C.A.P. member, left Hagans' ranch in the brother's plane to
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attend a regularly scheduled C.A.P. meeting. The ranch was
about 75 miles away from the Lamar Municipal Airport. The
mode of transportation to the meetings was the individual
member's choice, and the commander of the Lamar squadron
of the C.A.P. had approved of [sic} the Hagans flying to
meetings. The cost of transportation was borne by the
individual members. Enroute to the meeting, Hagans and his
brother received word that they could not land at Lamar
because of weather conditions. After turning around to return
to the ranch, the plane crashed and Hagans was injured.
The referee found that Hagans was considered to be under
C.A.P. jurisdiction from the time of leaving home until his
return following the meeting, and that the only purpose for
undertaking the travel was to attend the meeting.
Id.

The court agreed that "traveling to attend [the training] was included in the
activity by necessity; that Hagans' duty encompassed all of his activity from leaving for
the meeting until his return; that he was traveling at the behest of his employer; that,
therefore, his injury during travel arose out of and in the course of his employment; and
that Hagans' activities generated some benefit to the C.A.P. and, thus, had a dual
purpose." Id. The court acknowledged the coming and going rule but found an exception
applied.
Among such special circumstances is the exception that an
employer may agree, expressly or impliedly, that the
employment relation shall continue during the period of
coming and going. . . . Such an agreement may be inferred
here. The C.A.P. commander testified that, under patrol
regulations, its members are pursuing C.A.P. duties from the
time they leave home to attend a meeting until they return.
This testimony supports the finding of the Commission that
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"traveling to attend was included in the activity by necessity;
the duty of claimant encompassed all of his activity from the
moment of entering the aircraft to depart for the meeting,
through the time of travel."
Thus, when a claimant, at the time of his injury, is performing
- a duty with which he is charged as a part of his contract for
service, or under the express or implied direction of his
employer, he is within the course of his employment under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Id. at 196 (internal citations omitted).
The C.A.P. analysis is the most comparable to the employment situation
that exists between Ms. Martinez and the Idaho National Guard. As with the C.A.P.,
Idaho National Guard has agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that the employment
relation continues during the period of coming and going. See id. The existence of this
agreement is based on the following facts: Ms. Martinez was considered on duty with the
Idaho National Guard until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007; she was being paid at the time
of the accident by the National Guard; she was expected to comply with orders from her
superior officer to transport a fellow guardsman to Boise, Idaho; and because Ms.
Martinez was injured while acting pursuant to duty, the medical bills she incurred as a
result of the accident were paid by the Army National Guard. (R, pp. 167-168, 170-171,
173-174). Ms. Martinez' travel to Boise while transporting her fellow guardsman, was
within the course and scope of her employment with the Idaho National Guard.
Plaintiff cites State v. Superior Court of the State of Arizona et. ai., 524
P .2d 951 (1974), for the proposition that the coming and going rule should apply to
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national guardsmen driving to training drills. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.l8-19). In
Arizona, the guardsman was in an accident while traveling to the training but before the

time he was scheduled to report for duty. See id. at 953. This factor was significant to
the court and there was no evidence that the guardsman was considered "on duty" at the
time of the accident. The court stated that this " ... travel was not within the scope of the
employment unless the employee is rendering a service growing out of or incidental
to the employment." Id. at 954 (emphasis added).

It is undisputed that, unlike the facts in Arizona, at the time of the accident
in this case, Ms. Martinez was rendering a service incidental to her employment by
transporting her fellow guardsman at the instruction of her superior officer. (R, pp. 167,
173). Ms. Martinez was being paid and was considered to be "on-duty." See id.
In addition, state law applies to determine when an employee is acting
within the course and scope of their employment. There is no discussion of any of the
exceptions to the coming and going rule in the Arizona court's opinion so it is unclear
whether, in 1974, Arizona even recognized the same exceptions to the coming and going
rule that Idaho does today. Therefore, this case is distinguishable and is not controlling
on the Court in reaching its determination in this case.
2. Application of the coming and going rule exceptions to IT CA.
Although plaintiff argues that this Court should apply the coming and going
rule and find that Ms. Martinez was not acting within the course and scope of her
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employment, he claims that the well-known exceptions to the coming and going rule
would have to be specifically identified by the legislature in Idaho §6-904 before they
could be applied to determine Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her
employment. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 25). However, plaintiff cites no legal authority
that would require this Court to apply a general principle and not its well-recognized
exceptions.
In addition, all three exceptions, as well as the coming and going rule to
which the exceptions relate, are only relevant if the Court determines that workers'
compensation principles should be applied to tort cases within the purview of the Idaho
Tort Claims Act.
In Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 17,921 P.2d 190, 194 (1996), the Idaho
Court of Appeals stated that:
In worker's compensation cases, Idaho courts have applied the
"coming and going rule," which provides that an employee is
ordinarily not in the course of employment when going to or
coming from work .... While Idaho appellate courts have not
yet applied this rule in cases involving third-party negligence
actions, neighboring jurisdictions have. See e.g., Faul v.
Jelco, Inc., 122 Ariz. 490, 595 P.2d 1035, 1037
(Ct.App.1979); Connell v. Carl's Air Conditioning, 97 Nev.
436,634 P.2d 673,674 (1981); Skinner v. Braum's Ice Cream
Store, 890 P.2d 922, 924 (Okl.I995); Runyan v. Pickerd, 86
Or.App. 542, 740 P.2d 209, 210 (1987); Whitehead v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1989);
Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 457,716 P.2d 814, 819
(1986). We see no reason not to apply the coming and
going rule set forth in our worker's compensation cases to
cases involving third-party negligence actions brought
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against employers based on a theory of respondeat
superior.
The Court also discussed several exceptions to the coming and going rule. See id. at 18,
921 P.2d at 194.
Plaintiff is correct that the coming and going rule or its exceptions have
never been applied by an Idaho court in the context of analyzing course and scope of
employment under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Idaho Tort Claims Act does not
contain a definition of "course and scope of employment" nor does it state anywhere in
the act that workers' compensation principles should or should not be instructive when
determining the issue. See § I.C. 6-901 et. seq.

However, based on Casey, cited supra,

there's " ... no reason not to apply the coming and going rule ... " and its exceptions, to the
analysis of course and scope of employment under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. See
Casey, 129 Idaho at 17, 921 P .2d at 194.

The fact that we don't have definitive law on this point in Idaho is likely
why the District Court found "in the alternative" that if the coming and going rule applied
in this case, an exception to the rule also applied. (R, p. 338). The Court was responding
to the argument raised by plaintiff that the coming and going rule should apply and the
Court should find that Ms. Martinez was not acting in the course and scope of her
employment. See id.

If the coming and going rule applies, as originally argued by

plaintiff, then the exceptions to the coming and going rule must also be addressed.
The District Court only addressed one exception in its opinion but anyone

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

-22-

of the three exceptions raised by Ms. Martinez would be sufficient to defeat plaintiffs
argument and support the determination that, even under workers' compensation
principles, Ms. Martinez was acting within the course and scope of her employment with
the National Guard at the time of this accident.
E. Whether the District Court Properly Denied Plaintifrs Motion to Strike.
1. SSG Tony Rice's and Mallory Martinez' Affidavits do not contain
inadmissible legal conclusions.

In support of her Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Martinez filed her
own affidavit and an affidavit from SSG. Tony Rice. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike
certain paragraphs and exhibits of those Affidavits. Paragraph 5 of SSG Tony Rice's
Affidavit states: "January 7, 2007, was the final day of one of the 145 th 's regularly
scheduled instruction drills in Lewiston, Idaho and SPC Mallory Larson was in
attendance. SPC Larson was on duty from 12:00 a.m. from January 6, 2007 to 11 :59 p.m.
on January 7, 2007." (R, p. 167). Paragraph 6 of Ms. Martinez' Affidavit states that "[a]t
the time of the accident on January 7, 2007, I was on duty with the Idaho National Guard
and was acting under my superior's orders by transporting a fellow guardsman to Boise,
Idaho." (R, p. 173). Ms. Martinez' superior officer is SSG Rice.
Paragraph 7 of SSG Rice's Affidavit states:
SPC Larson notified me of the accident after it occurred. A
Line of Duty Report of Investigation was completed. The
result of the investigation determined that SPC Larson was on
duty at the time of the accident and her medical bills were
paid as a result of that determination. A fair and accurate
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copy of the Report of Investigation which is maintained as a
regular course in the personnel file of SPC Larson of which I
am personally familiar, is Attached as Exhibit A ....
CR, p. 167). Paragraph 7 of Ms. Martinez's Affidavit states:
After the accident, I reported it to SSG Rice and an
investigation was completed to determine if I was on duty. I
cooperated in that investigation and received a copy of the
report once it was completed. A fair and accurate copy of the
report I received is attached as Exhibit A ...
CR, p. 173).
As the superior officer of Ms. Martinez, SSG Rice would know when he
and Ms. Martinez were considered to be "on duty" for the purpose of the Idaho National
Guard's policies and procedures.

This is a fact of which SSG Rice has personal

knowledge and to which he can testify. Similarly, Ms. Martinez knew she was getting
paid by the National Guard until 11 :59 p.m. on January 7, 2007, and she notified her
supervising officer immediately after the accident. All of which is consistent with her
understanding that she was "on duty," a fact that, as a member of the National Guard, she
would have personal knowledge of.
As explained below, because the document attached to the Affidavits as
Exhibit A is admissible pursuant to the Records of Regularly Conducted Activity and the
Public Records and Reports exceptions to the hearsay rule, the information contained in
that report is likewise not an inadmissible legal conclusion.
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2. Exhibit A to SSG Rice's and Ms. Martinez' Affidavits are admissible
pursuant to the records of regularly conducted activity and public
records and reports exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6) and (8) state the following documents are
admissible even though they contain hearsay:

(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses,
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a
regularly conducted business activity, and ifit was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by
certification that complies with Rule 902( 11), unless the
source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
"business" as used in this paragraph includes business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

(8) Public Records and Reports. Unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or data
compilations in any form of a public office or agency setting
forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities,
or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as
to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law. The following are not within this exception to
the hearsay rule: (A) investigative reports by police and other
law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an
accused in a criminal case; (B) investigative reports prepared
by or for a government, a public office or an agency when
offered by it in a case in which it is a party; (C) factual
findings offered by the government in criminal cases; (D)
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factual findings resulting from special investigation of a
particular complaint, case, or incident, except when offered
by an accused in a criminal case.
As explained by SSG Rice, Exhibit A attached to his Affidavit is a Line of
Duty Report that was completed after the accident in this case. (R, pp. 167-168). This
report is kept during the regular course of the Idaho National Guard in Ms. Martinez'
personnel file with which SSG Rice, as her superior officer, is personally familiar. As
such, SSG Rice is a qualifying witness pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 902( 11) and
has met all criteria to establish the admissibility of Exhibit A as a record of regularly
conducted business pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(6).
In addition, the National Guard is a public office or agency which issued
this Line of Duty Report as factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law.

Therefore, the Line of Duty Report is also

admissible pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(8).
3. The District Court properly denied plaintiff's Motion to Strike.

The District Court held that the statements by Ms. Martinez and SSG Rice
are admissible because the "affiants are testifying as to facts they have personal
knowledge about." (R, p. 329).

The District Court further held that the documents

attached to the affidavits fell under the I.R.E 803(8) exception to the hearsay rule. Id.
Finally, the District Court determined that it would have reached the same conclusion in
granting Ms. Martinez' Motion for Summary Judgment even if the exhibits had been
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stricken. Id.
The District Court properly denied plaintiffs Motion to Strike because the
evidence contained in the affidavits of Ms. Martinez and SSG Rice is admissible. Even if
it were not however, the denial of the Motion was harmless error because the District
Court concluded there was sufficient evidence, without the exhibits, to grant Ms.
Martinez' Motion for Summary Judgment.
F. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Plaintiff claims that if he is the prevailing party on appeal, he is entitled to
an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and Rule 54. (See Appellant's Brief, p.
29). Although plaintiff correctly states that "[a]n award of attorney fees is appropriate on
appeal under I.C. § 12-121when the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation ... ," he does not state how Ms. Martinez has defended
this appeal frivolously. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 29). In Chavez v. Canyon County, et.

al., 152 Idaho 297,305,271 P.3d 695,703 (2012), the Court held that "Chavez did not
provide authority for this issue, nor did he argue how this appeal was defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation by the County. Without such, it will not
be considered on appeal."
Plaintiff s request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied.
G. Ms. Martinez is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Should the Court rule in Ms. Martinez' favor, she requests this Court award
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attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54. As stated
above, an award of attorney fees is appropriate on appeal when the appeal has been
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See id. In Bowles

v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,377,973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999), the Court expounded
further on what it means to bring an appeal without foundation. "An award of attorney
fees is appropriate 'if the law is well-settled and the appellants have made 'no substantial
showing that the district court misapplied the law.' " Id. (internal citations omitted). In
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 81, 644 P.2d 1333, 1340 (1982), the Court awarded fees to

the respondent when "a dispassionate view of the record disc1os[ ed] there was no valid
reason to anticipate reversal of the judgment below on the factual grounds urged. The
record contain[ ed] abundant evidence supporting the determination of the judge and
jury."
In this case, plaintiff has not presented any valid reasons to anticipate
reversal of the District Court's decision. There are no materials issues of fact and the
District Court's application of the undisputed facts to the law was well reasoned. Ms.
Martinez therefore requests that she be awarded her costs and attorney fees on appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ms. Martinez produced uncontroverted evidence that, at the time of the
accident, she was on duty acting within the course and scope of her employment and
acting in accordance to duty by complying with instructions given to her by her superior
officer to transport her fellow guardsman to Boise. (R, p. 167, ~ ~ 5-6).
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In accordance with Idaho Code § 6-904(4), Idaho National Guard members
cannot be held liable for state law claims arising out of their activities when they are in
training or acting under duty pursuant to certain federal statutes, including 32 U.S.C.A.
§502.
The District Court properly determined that the exemption under Idaho
Code § 6-904(4) applied and granted Ms. Martinez's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court uphold the District's Court's Summary
Judgment Order dismissing plaintiffs claims in this matter.

DATED this 25 th day of March 2013.

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

6~ER1k~~tla,~
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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